Beginner’s Question About Theistic Utilitarianism

How does it make sense to hold both beliefs?

I post this in the hope that a bona fide theistic utilitarian will address my concerns about someone holding both these beliefs—theism and utilitarianism. I don’t do philosophy, so this is just back-of-the-envelope stuff. There are bound to be errors.

The Drowning Child Example

If the necessity of rescuing the child drowning in the shallow pond at the price of one’s shoes is a clear illustration of why utilitarianism is morally correct, how is it morally defensible for God to let the child drown when He could’ve saved her at no personal cost to Himself? And if the answer is that God must allow that child’s suffering in order to maximize her eternal happiness, how is it still morally right for anyone else to save the child?

To me, this suggests the following contradiction:

1. If God exists and is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then the current world must be in some sense the best possible world.

2. If the current world is the best possible world, then any action we take cannot make it morally better.

3. Utilitarianism requires that our actions can meaningfully improve moral outcomes.

4. Therefore, if theism is true, utilitarianism is either false or meaningless.

5. Thus, classical theism and utilitarianism are incompatible.

Possible Counters?

I’d guess that the counters to this might include the following:

1. The "different roles" resolution: Maybe moral obligations differ based on the agent's role and knowledge. Humans, with limited knowledge, are obligated to prevent immediate suffering they can see. God, with perfect knowledge, operates on a different moral level that optimizes for ultimate outcomes. This would mean utilitarianism applies differently at different scales/levels of knowledge. This is to me the strongest resolution.

2. The "compatible paths" resolution: Perhaps God's plan for achieving greater good already takes into account and incorporates predictable human moral behavior. When we save the drowning child, that action is already part of the path to the greater good, not an interference with it.

3. The "local vs global" resolution: Human moral obligations could be primarily about local optimization (saving the child) while God handles global optimization (ultimate outcomes). These wouldn't conflict because they operate at different scales.

Responses to Counters

In response to counter 1, if morality is about optimizing outcomes, then whether God or a human acts shouldn’t change whether saving the child is the right thing to do. If God’s non-intervention ensures the “perfect” amount of suffering for salvation, then a human saving the child must either disrupt that perfection (making it the wrong choice) or have no real effect (making moral action meaningless). Either way, it contradicts utilitarianism, which requires that our actions affect moral outcomes. The “different roles” defense fails because it makes the same action both right (for humans) and wrong (for God) without a clear justification.

In response to counter 2, it seems to completely free the man from moral obligation. If God’s already done the moral accounting, what’s the point of utilitarianism? Whatever the man does or doesn’t do ethically is already factored into perfection. His actions can’t add to or subtract from the perfect happiness of the drowning girl because God already priced in whatever ethical decision we make.

In response to counter 3, if the man didn’t intervene locally and save the child, and God won’t because He’s a big-picture guy, it means the child suffered more than necessary and didn’t receive God’s perfect love. If local optimization matters at all, it must factor into global optimization. How can you claim that both:

1. Local suffering matters enough to create moral obligations for humans

2. Local suffering doesn't matter enough for God to prevent it

Conclusion

Utilitarianism requires that we can improve outcomes through moral action. But classical theism (particularly the omnibenevolent + omnipotent mix) seems to require that all outcomes are already optimized—if they weren't, God would have optimized them, since He could do so at no cost.

This leaves the theistic utilitarian in an awkward position of either:

1. Claiming their moral actions improve outcomes (contradicting divine optimization)

2. Claiming their moral actions don't improve outcomes (contradicting utilitarianism)

I’d guess that a theistic utilitarian’s explanation beyond this might involve an additional appeal to God’s mystery or an addition to God’s functional complexity.

The appeal to mystery has always puzzled me. If we don’t know how He does things but see imperfection in his results (widespread earthly suffering), then how are we to judge Him perfect?

And each addition of divine complexity reminds me a bit of how medieval astronomers added increasingly complex explanations to maintain both geocentrism and their observational data, when the simpler solution was to just let go of their starting assumptions. In cases like this, simplicity can sometimes lead to truth.