Thanks for reading, and replying. I’ve read your Archon essay twice and commented some time ago on it. But I’m not sure how even if it were true it makes utilitarianism necessary or meaningful for human beings.
The Archon essay’s "connection-building" justification seems to reduce moral action to something like theater—if the value is in the relationship-building rather than the actual prevention of suffering, it kind of undermines utilitarianism’s, well, utility.
And relying on the infinite value of heaven makes it seem like all finite moral calculations are ultimately meaningless.
Edit: the more I think about it, the more the Archon essay, while a response to the problem of evil, seems to undermine utilitarianism as a useful practice rather than bolstering it. What am I missing?
> How does the archon theodicy have anything to do with that?
Good question. My post had nothing to do with the archon theodicy. It doesn’t mention it. You brought it up in your response to my post asking how it makes sense to be both utilitarian and theistic. You said:
This baffled me, too. Whatever the theodicy has to do with theistic utilitarianism, I’m not sure. It was your idea to connect the theodicy to theistic utilitarianism, the subject of my post. In my reply to your comment, I tried to make sense of you introducing it, but I can’t do it. The theodicy was the only answer you offered.
Honestly, this one of the most convoluted exchanges I’ve ever had. You link me to the theodicy as the answer to why utilitarianism and theism aren’t contradictory, I respond by saying, I don’t get how angels and demons would do that, then you ask me what the heck they have to do with utilitarianism anyways? I say I don’t know, since you’re the one who brought it up, at which point you say “well the theodicy provided an account of why a theistic utilitarian God might allow evil!” thereby answering the question you just indicated you didn’t have the answer to.
I wish you the best man, but this sure felt like some rhetorical nonsense.
I’m sure you’d agree that enough time’s been spent on this. Thanks for replying. Take care.
I think you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. I'm not saying the archon theodicy has something to do with utilitarianism. I'm disputing the claim that " I’m not sure how even if it were true it makes utilitarianism necessary or meaningful for human beings." This is the thing I don't get.
I am not a philosopher, a theist, or a utilitarian. However, I would like to add my opinion as uninformed as it is, just because :))
I believe this is a matter of point of view. As humans, we are bound by our limits of being in time and place (and may I add human society context?). However, if there is a god, he or she or ze, is not bound by time or place or the specific context of being part of a society. As a result, there is no good reason to assume moral realities (if we are moral realists as utilitarians are) that apply to these two different entities should be the same
I guess I am trying to say, moral rules do not need to be universal to be real, the same way that navigation abilities of bats through ecolocation are real, but species-specific (mostly) and their lack of universality does not reduce their realness
Thanks. I see what you’re saying and you certainly could be right. (I kind of try to address something like your point in my response to counter 3.) But it still leaves me with the question:
If God exists, the one thing in the example of the drowning girl that remains absolute between the man’s moral decision and God’s is the eternal outcome for the little girl. If her mortal suffering is to her eternal benefit, then how can the utilitarian act of saving her positively benefit her eternal outcome? And if one argues that her mortal suffering isn’t to her eternal benefit (thus serving no purpose) what does this say about God’s omnibenevolence?
I totally understand your concerns and to be honest even if I can ever become a theist again, I don't think there is a good reason to believe that the God is Omnibenevolent. But playing the devil's advocate, my answer is that the girl's suffering is balanced by some rewards in the afterlife in a way that Her eternal outcome hasn't changed. However, by acting on moral code of reduce her suffering in this time and place, the savior has improved his or her eternal outcome which in improves the total utils for total beings.
You'll want some story about why God had reason to adopt a policy of not intervening, but our intervening is good. I give one such proposal here https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-archon-abandonment-theodicy
Thanks for reading, and replying. I’ve read your Archon essay twice and commented some time ago on it. But I’m not sure how even if it were true it makes utilitarianism necessary or meaningful for human beings.
The Archon essay’s "connection-building" justification seems to reduce moral action to something like theater—if the value is in the relationship-building rather than the actual prevention of suffering, it kind of undermines utilitarianism’s, well, utility.
And relying on the infinite value of heaven makes it seem like all finite moral calculations are ultimately meaningless.
Edit: the more I think about it, the more the Archon essay, while a response to the problem of evil, seems to undermine utilitarianism as a useful practice rather than bolstering it. What am I missing?
I don’t know what you mean! Utilitarianism is a theory about what actions are right. How does the archon theodicy have anything to do with that?
One should, of course, in part try to prevent suffering because suffering is bad and in part to build connections
> How does the archon theodicy have anything to do with that?
Good question. My post had nothing to do with the archon theodicy. It doesn’t mention it. You brought it up in your response to my post asking how it makes sense to be both utilitarian and theistic. You said:
> You'll want some story about why God had reason to adopt a policy of not intervening, but our intervening is good. I give one such proposal here https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-archon-abandonment-theodicy
This baffled me, too. Whatever the theodicy has to do with theistic utilitarianism, I’m not sure. It was your idea to connect the theodicy to theistic utilitarianism, the subject of my post. In my reply to your comment, I tried to make sense of you introducing it, but I can’t do it. The theodicy was the only answer you offered.
Well the theodicy provided an account of why a theistic utilitarian God might allow evil!
Honestly, this one of the most convoluted exchanges I’ve ever had. You link me to the theodicy as the answer to why utilitarianism and theism aren’t contradictory, I respond by saying, I don’t get how angels and demons would do that, then you ask me what the heck they have to do with utilitarianism anyways? I say I don’t know, since you’re the one who brought it up, at which point you say “well the theodicy provided an account of why a theistic utilitarian God might allow evil!” thereby answering the question you just indicated you didn’t have the answer to.
I wish you the best man, but this sure felt like some rhetorical nonsense.
I’m sure you’d agree that enough time’s been spent on this. Thanks for replying. Take care.
I think you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. I'm not saying the archon theodicy has something to do with utilitarianism. I'm disputing the claim that " I’m not sure how even if it were true it makes utilitarianism necessary or meaningful for human beings." This is the thing I don't get.
What if us being utilitarian is part of God's plan?
I am not a philosopher, a theist, or a utilitarian. However, I would like to add my opinion as uninformed as it is, just because :))
I believe this is a matter of point of view. As humans, we are bound by our limits of being in time and place (and may I add human society context?). However, if there is a god, he or she or ze, is not bound by time or place or the specific context of being part of a society. As a result, there is no good reason to assume moral realities (if we are moral realists as utilitarians are) that apply to these two different entities should be the same
I guess I am trying to say, moral rules do not need to be universal to be real, the same way that navigation abilities of bats through ecolocation are real, but species-specific (mostly) and their lack of universality does not reduce their realness
Thanks. I see what you’re saying and you certainly could be right. (I kind of try to address something like your point in my response to counter 3.) But it still leaves me with the question:
If God exists, the one thing in the example of the drowning girl that remains absolute between the man’s moral decision and God’s is the eternal outcome for the little girl. If her mortal suffering is to her eternal benefit, then how can the utilitarian act of saving her positively benefit her eternal outcome? And if one argues that her mortal suffering isn’t to her eternal benefit (thus serving no purpose) what does this say about God’s omnibenevolence?
I totally understand your concerns and to be honest even if I can ever become a theist again, I don't think there is a good reason to believe that the God is Omnibenevolent. But playing the devil's advocate, my answer is that the girl's suffering is balanced by some rewards in the afterlife in a way that Her eternal outcome hasn't changed. However, by acting on moral code of reduce her suffering in this time and place, the savior has improved his or her eternal outcome which in improves the total utils for total beings.